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1 Introduction
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models used in international macroeconomics have
been reasonably successful at matching macroeconomic quantities, but are inconsistent with
basic features of asset prices and exchange rates, such as their volatility, correlation across
countries, and correlation with interest rates and other macroeconomic aggregates. Moreover,
these models imply very small equity and currency risk premia, in contrast to the large
average excess returns that are well documented in the empirical finance literature.
Recent work in international finance, notably Bekaert (1996), Bansal (1997), Backus
et al. (2001), and Lustig et al. (forthcoming), suggests a possible reconciliation between
asset prices (including real exchange rates) and quantities. The failure of the uncovered
interest rate parity condition (UIP) and the high average return to a “carry trade” strategy
imply two restrictions on any no-arbitrage model: (1) aggregate risk must be time-varying,
and (2) countries must differ in their exposures to aggregate risk.
We embed these features in a standard two-country real business cycle (RBC) model in
the tradition of Backus et al. (1992). Following Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Gabaix (2008),
and Gourio (2009), we model time-varying risk as a small, time-varying probability of a
worldwide economic disaster, such as the Great Depression. Specifically, a disaster is modeled
as a simultaneous large permanent decline in productivity and a capital destruction. One
country is assumed to have a higher exposure to the world disaster—the productivity and
capital shocks are larger if a disaster is realized. These assumptions imply that conditions
(1) and (2) above are satisfied.
In the model, variations in disaster probability lead to changes in risk premia and asset
prices and to variations in macroeconomic quantities. An increase in the probability of
disasters leads to a decline of investment, because higher uncertainty makes it less attractive
to hold risky capital. Output and employment also fall given the lower investment demand,
leading to a recession. These business cycle dynamics occur with no change in total factor
productivity (TFP), and even if no disaster is realized in sample. Moreover, stock prices and
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interest rates fall, while spreads on risky securities increase. In our model, the two countries
have different levels of riskiness, and the recession and the ensuing decline in stock prices
are stronger in the more risky country—the country that would be hit hardest by a disaster
realization.
Because of higher precautionary savings, the more risky country has a lower interest
rate. When the disaster probability rises, the exchange rate of this country appreciates,
because its marginal utility rises more. As a result, high interest rate currencies tend to
depreciate during bad times, as they do in the data. This implies that the return on a carry
trade strategy is risky, leading investors to require on average a positive excess return to
compensate for this risk; hence, our model is consistent with the average return on the carry
trade.
We evaluate our model by comparing its predictions to the data for a large set of moments.
We start by documenting some new stylized facts about asset prices and business cycle
dynamics for high and low interest rate countries. We show that equity returns, interest
rates, and business cycles are more volatile in high interest rate countries, while average
equity excess returns are lower.
We find that our simple framework helps to reconcile international RBC models with the
data. The model implies that (1) real exchange rates are about twice more volatile than in the
basic RBC model; (2) macroeconomic aggregates are more correlated across countries than in
the RBC model; (3) asset returns are more correlated across countries than macroeconomic
aggregates, with a correlation of about 0.9, (4) the correlation of relative consumption growth
and the exchange rate is 0.6, versus 1.0 in the standard model (the Backus and Smith (1993)
anomaly) and (5) the UIP condition is not satisfied and a carry trade strategy delivers a 2.5%
annual average excess return, compared to essentially zero in the RBC model. As in Gourio
(2009), our model is also consistent with business cycle and asset pricing facts within each
country, such as the mean and volatility of equity and risk-free returns, the predictability of
returns, and the correlation between asset prices and investment or output.
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Our model, however, falters in a fundamental and important way: in our model low
interest rate countries are the most risky, and hence have volatile quantities and returns. In
the data, the low interest rate countries have lower volatilities. This tension appears difficult
to resolve, and calls for future research.
One important element of our approach is recursive preferences (Epstein and Zin, 1989).
We assume that risk aversion is higher than the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (IES). This implies that agents prefer an early resolution for uncertainty. These
preferences decouple consumption from marginal utility of wealth. As a result, the exchange
rate is not perfectly correlated with the relative consumption growth, allowing us to make
progress on the Backus and Smith (1993) anomaly. Moreover, recursive preferences imply
that volatility shocks are priced: as a result, times of heightened uncertainty (when the
probability of disaster is high) have a high marginal utility, even though consumption might
initially rise. Intuitively, the marginal value of consumption now depends not only on current
consumption, but also on future (continuation) utility. When risk increases, future utility is
low, both because of a low mean and a high uncertainty. This low future utility increases the
marginal utility of wealth immediately. Hence, assets that have low payoffs when disaster
risk is high have positive excess returns.
Finally, we test the key mechanism of the model: an increase in disaster probability
should negatively affect output and employment. Three clear results emerge. First, we find
that equity implied volatility in the United States is highly correlated with the risk of large
drops in U.S. equity prices, as measured in equity option markets over the last 15 years.
This is consistent with our model, in which high probabilities of disaster are associated with
high equity return volatilities. Thus, a change in volatility can be used as a proxy for a
change in disaster probability. Building on this finding, we study the response of macroe-
conomic quantities and prices to volatility shocks. We measure volatility as the monthly
standard deviation of realized daily equity returns. Second, we find that there is substantial
co-movement of volatility worldwide. This is consistent with the model because we assume
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that the disaster probability is common across countries. Third, aggregate volatility af-
fects macroeconomic outcomes. We find that when global volatility (measured as average
volatility of equity returns across G-7 countries) increases, industrial production falls and
unemployment rises in all G7 countries. These results generalize Bloom’s (2009) empirical
findings for the U.S. to a large set of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) countries and different measures of volatilities.
The paper is organized as follows. The rest of the introduction reviews the related
literature. Section 2 documents a set of stylized facts on macroeconomic quantities, exchange
rates and assets prices, for low and high interest rate countries. Section 3 presents our model
without international trade, parametrizes this model, and studies whether it can match the
facts established in Section 2. Section 4 tests directly for the model key mechanism by
studying empirically the impact of global uncertainty on macroeconomic variables. Section
5 concludes. A separate Online Appendix presents data sources, additional data statistics,
our computational method, as well as some additional model results and robustness checks.
This paper contributes to the vast theoretical literature on international real business
cycles. We do not attempt to summarize it here.1 The paper is also closely related to the
recent macroeconomics and finance literature on disaster risk.2
Closest to our work are recent studies by Farhi and Gabaix (2008) and Guo (2009),
who are the first to show that a disaster risk model can reproduce the UIP puzzle. Our
contribution is to extend their work to a standard production economy with Epstein and Zin
(1989) preferences, using a wider set of data moments to evaluate the model, and to uncover
a new tension between models of carry trades and macroeconomic volatilities. Our work is
1Some seminal contributions are Backus et al. (1992), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), Heathcote and Perri
(2002), Chari et al. (2002), Devereux and Engel (2002), and Engel and West (2005). Some key recent
contributions are Dotsey and Duarte (2008), Corsetti et al. (2008a), and Engel et al. (2007).
2See notably Rietz (1988), Barro (2006), Gabaix (2008), Gourio (2009), Liu et al. (2005), Wachter (2008),
Barro et al. (2010). Jurek (2008), Backus et al. (forthcoming), and Farhi et al. (2009) confront the disaster
risk model to option data.
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also related to Gourinchas et al. (2010), who document that the U.S. provides insurance to
the rest of the world, especially in times of global stress. They show that a simple disaster
risk model accounts for the large collapse in U.S. net foreign assets.
While we model time-varying aggregate risk using a time-varying probability of worldwide
disaster, similar results can be derived with stochastic volatility, as emphasized in the long-
run risk model of Bansal and Yaron (2004). Bansal and Shaliastovich (2008), Colacito
(2008), and Colacito and Croce (2011a) show that this class of models also offers a potential
explanation to the UIP puzzle. For the case of a two-country endowment economy, Colacito
and Croce (2011b) show that Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences and exposure to a small, but
highly persistent, common source of risk can help explain some regularities of the behavior
of exchange rates, replicating both the volatility of real exchange rates and the correlation of
pricing kernels across countries. Our paper provides the production economy foundations for
the common source of risk. Lustig, Roussanov, and Verdelhan (2010), by focusing on reduced
form pricing kernels, show that heterogenous exposure to a world risk factor is needed in
order to account for currency risk premia. Our paper provides an economic interpretation
for the source of this heterogeneity, as the cross-sectional heterogeneity of the magnitude of
capital destruction following a disaster.
This paper builds on the disaster risk literature but leaves open other interpretations.
While the risk of an economic disaster is, in our model, a strictly rational expectation, it can
also be interpreted as an irrational belief, which is potentially biased, or excessively volatile.
We examine the macroeconomic effects of a time-varying belief for international economics.
The time-varying disaster risk captures the idea that there are some asset price changes that
are not obviously related to current or future TFP, i.e., “bubbles,” or “animal spirits,” and
which in turn affect the macroeconomy.
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2 Stylized facts
We begin with some stylized facts about business cycles, exchange rates, and asset prices in
a novel form. While business cycles are often analyzed on a country-by-country basis, re-
cent work in international finance—starting with Lustig and Verdelhan (2007)—shows that
exchange rate puzzles and return differentials emerge most clearly when the researcher con-
structs artificial, composite “low interest rate” and “high interest rate” countries. We follow
this approach: at each date t, we sort countries into four groups according to their beginning-
of-period nominal interest rate. We compute returns and growth rates of macroeconomic
quantities, for each country in each group, from time t to time t+ 4. We take, at each date,
the average within each group of these returns or macroeconomic quantities and focus on
the groups with the lowest and highest interest rates. This procedure produces time series
for two artificial composite countries: a low interest country (i.e., group of the low countries)
and a high interest rate country (i.e., group of high interest rate countries). Of course, the
composition of countries in each group is time-varying, although some countries are almost
always in one group. (For instance, Japan and Switzerland are often in the low interest rate
group, and Australia and New Zealand are often in the high interest rate group.)
The stylized facts are reported in Panel I of Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4. We focus on OECD
countries over the post-Bretton Woods sample and use quarterly series. The data sources
are described in a separate Appendix. We report annual growth rates and, for each statistic,
standard errors obtained by bootstrapping under the assumption that returns or growth
rates are i.i.d. Each block in the bootstrap contains four observations and we repeat the
estimation 1,000 times.
2.1 Business cycle moments
Table 1 provides the basic business cycle statistics for each composite group. For the low
interest rate group, we obtain standard business cycle facts: investment is almost three times
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more volatile than output, consumption is 20% less volatile than output, and employment
volatility is about two-thirds that of output. For the high interest rate group, consumption
is more volatile than output. Comparing the two groups, we see that all quantities are
more volatile in the high interest rate group: the volatility of consumption growth, for
example, ranges from 1.4% per year for the low interest rate group to 2.6% per year for
the high interest rate group. Investment is more volatile, ranging from 4.4% to 7.7% per
year. Consistent with the international macroeconomics literature, we also find that there
is substantial synchronization of business cycles across countries, especially for investment
and output: the correlation between output growth in the high and low interest rate groups
is around 0.5.
[Table 1 about here.]
2.2 Equity risk premia and interest rates
It is well known that the average excess return on the U.S. stock market is large (the “equity
premium puzzle”); however, this large average excess return is not unique to the U.S. Table
2 shows that the low interest rate group has large average excess returns (4.5% per year); the
high interest rate group has a significantly lower average excess returns (1.1% per year). The
two groups also differ by the volatilities of their interest rates and equity returns, which are
clearly larger in the high interest rate group. Interest rates are highly persistent, and fairly
smooth, in both groups. By construction, the high interest rate group has a higher average
interest rate. Finally, there is a significant cross-country correlation of equity markets, and
interest rates.
[Table 2 about here.]
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2.3 Exchange rate and carry trades
We construct the real exchange rate between the low and high interest rate group, and
compute exchange rate statistics in Table 3. Consistent with the literature, we find that
this real exchange rate is volatile: the log change in the exchange rate has a standard
deviation of about 8.6% per year, and exhibits little serial correlation at quarterly frequency
(the overlapping observations—annual changes measured at a quarterly frequency—drive
the high autocorrelation coefficient in the table). We also find that the log change in the
exchange rate, while little skewed, is leptokurtic. In addition, the correlation of the change in
the exchange rate with the relative stock market returns is low, the correlation with relative
consumption growth is negative (the Kolman-Backus-Smith puzzle), and the correlations
with market and interest rate differences across countries are small.
[Table 3 about here.]
Table 4 focuses on the properties of the carry trade. According to the standard uncovered
interest rate parity (UIP) condition, the change in the exchange rate should, on average,
equal the corresponding interest rate differential, so that the average return to investing in
either group of countries should be the same. A large body of empirical work, however,
documents violations of UIP [see Hansen and Hodrick (1980) and Fama (1984), and surveys
by Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996)]. The currency carry trade is the investment strategy
to borrow in low interest rate currencies and invest in high interest rate currencies. This
strategy delivers an excess return above 5.3% per year and a Sharpe ratio of 0.55 (higher
than the Sharpe ratios on equity markets). Note that this excess return and Sharpe ratio do
not take into account transaction costs. Net average excess returns would be lower. Lustig
et al. (forthcoming) show that the average return on a carry trade strategy compensates
investors for the exposure to world shocks. We thus report the correlation of the carry trade
return with the world average consumption growth, investment growth, employment growth
and output growth, and the world average stock return. These correlations, while small,
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are positive, reaching 0.3 for consumption, investment, and output. Finally, in a standard
regression of the change in the exchange rate on the interest rate differential, the slope
coefficient is slightly negative, whereas it should equal one under UIP.
[Table 4 about here.]
After discussing the stylized facts of the low interest rate country and high interest rate
country in the data, we now turn to our model.
3 The model
In this section, we study a two-country, one-good international real business cycle model.
Following a recent literature (e.g., Brandt et al. (2006), Colacito and Croce (2011b), Bansal
and Shaliastovich (2008), Alvarez et al. (2009), Verdelhan (2010), and Ang and Chen (2010)),
we assume that asset markets are complete, but frictions in goods markets prevent any net
trade of goods. As a result, we can solve for the allocation of each country separately.
Under these assumptions, the exchange rate change is the ratio of the foreign and domestic
stochastic discount factors.3
We make these assumptions for two reasons. First, it is difficult to solve a complete
market model with two agents, production, and recursive preferences. The technical difficulty
is that the planner problem is not recursive in the “natural” state variables, such as capital
stocks and productivity. Continuation values must be added as state variables, leading to
a curse of dimensionality. Second, the setup without net trade is a natural starting point,
3This no-trade approach is a first step, as the ultimate goal is to build a model that generates the positive,
but imperfect, risk-sharing that takes place in the data. However, because there is sometimes confusion
regarding this approach, it is important to realize that it is internally consistent. From an individual point
of view, agents are able to write state-contingent contracts that specify the delivery of goods in either country
in any state of the world. However, in the aggregate there can be no net trade, hence the exchange rate has to
adjust to make no trade an equilibrium. Hence, if our model generates the correct allocation of consumption
and leisure across countries, and markets are complete, the exchange rate that we find must be the correct
one. This is similar to the way the risk-free rate is determined in standard representative agent models: the
risk-free asset is in zero net supply, so that no agent holds the risk-free asset in equilibrium, but agents are
free to consider buying it, and the price of this asset is precisely such that net trade in this asset is nil.
10
because it is unlikely that the model with net trade can match the data if the model without
net trade does not. The volatility of the exchange rate is likely to be lower in the model
with trade. In Gourio et al. (2010), we relax this zero net trade assumption in the context
of a small open economy model, and study the implications for capital flows.
3.1 Model setup
Our business cycle model differs from the standard RBC model in two ways: first, we
introduce recursive preferences, and second, we introduce time-varying disaster risk. The
model builds on the closed economy model developed in Gourio (2009).
3.1.1 Domestic economy
In the home country, a representative consumer maximizes a recursive utility function,
Vt =
((
(1− β)Cυt (1−Nt)1−υ
)1−γ
+ βEt
(
V 1−θt+1
) 1−γ
1−θ
) 1
1−γ
. (1)
Here υ reflects the preference for consumption Ct as opposed to leisure 1 − Nt, γ is the
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) over the consumption-leisure
bundle, and θ measures risk aversion towards static gambles over the bundle. The risk
aversion over consumption is υθ (Swanson, 2009).
There is a representative firm that produces output using a standard Cobb-Douglas
production function:
Yt = K
α
t (ztNt)
1−α , (2)
where Kt is the capital stock and zt denotes the total factor productivity, to be described
below. The firm accumulates capital subject to adjustment costs:
Kt+1 =
(
(1− δ)Kt + φ
(
It
Kt
)
Kt
)
(1− xt+1bk), (3)
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where φ is an increasing and concave function, whose curvature captures adjustment costs.
The dummy variable xt+1 is 1 if a disaster hits at time t + 1 (with probability pt) and is
0 otherwise (with probability 1 − pt). The parameter bk represents the capital destruction
following a disaster.
The assumption that a disaster reduces the capital stock requires some discussion. While
wars or natural disasters such as earthquakes or tsunamis physically destroy capital, economic
depressions do not. Capital destruction can be interpreted more broadly to reflect the
expropriation of capital holders (if the capital is taken away and then used very inefficiently)
or the destruction of intangible capital (such as matches between firms, employees, and
customers) Finally, one can imagine a situation where the demand for some goods falls
sharply, rendering worthless the factories producing these goods. In terms of the economic
mechanism, the assumption of capital destruction ensures that the return on capital is risky,
i.e., the realized return on capital is low during disasters. From this standpoint, it is a fairly
sensible assumption.4
Since there is no net trade, the resource constraint is simply Ct + It = Yt. TFP follows a
unit root process, and is affected by standard “small normal shocks” εt+1, as well as disasters:
log zt+1 = log zt + µ+ σεt+1 + xt+1 log(1− btfp), (4)
where εt+1 is i.i.d., normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance N(0, 1), µ is the
drift of TFP, σ is the standard deviation of Gaussian shocks, and btfp is the reduction in
TFP following a disaster. The probability of disaster pt follows an autoregressive process of
order one (AR(1)) in log:
log(pt+1) = ρ log(pt) + µp + σpεp,t+1, (5)
4One possibility is to make capital endogenously risky by assuming large adjustment costs. In this
case a large negative shock to TFP reduces investment, leading the price of capital (“marginal Q”) to fall
significantly.
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where εp,t+1 is i.i.d. normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance.
5
3.1.2 Foreign economy
The foreign country has the same preferences and technology as the domestic economy. The
disaster is perfectly correlated across the two countries: the same xt+1 (indicator of disaster
realization), pt+1 (probability of disaster), and εp,t+1 (innovation to the log probability of
disaster) apply to both. The domestic and the foreign economy differ only in their riskiness
parameters, bk and btfp and b
∗
k and b
∗
tfp.
6 We think of this simple assumption as capturing the
fact that countries have different exposures to world risk, perhaps due to different industry
compositions or different financial structures.
We allow the normally distributed shocks εt and ε
∗
t to be contemporaneously correlated,
consistent with our data. Compared to a standard international RBC model, the model
adds a common source of shocks through the probability of disaster shock εp,t+1. Overall,
the model has four shocks: the usual TFP shocks at home and abroad, εt+1 and ε
∗
t+1, as well
as the realization of disaster, xt+1, and the shock to the probability of disaster, εp,t+1.
3.1.3 Asset prices and exchange rate
In this model, the stochastic discount factor in the home country is,
Mt,t+1 = β
(
Ct+1
Ct
)υ(1−γ)−1(
1−Nt+1
1−Nt
)(1−υ)(1−γ) Vt+1
Et
(
V 1−θt+1
) 1
1−θ
γ−θ , (6)
and similarly in the foreign economy. We define the real exchange rate Qt in units of domestic
goods per foreign good, i.e., 1 foreign good = Qt home goods, so that a higher Qt reflects
both a foreign appreciation and a home depreciation.
5The probability of disaster needs to lie between 0 and 1. The AR(1) specification does not ensure that
constraint. When we solve our model, however, we approximate the AR(1) process with a Markov chain,
whose support does lie between 0 and 1.
6An interesting extension of the model is to make the riskiness of each country, i.e. the parameters
bk, btfp, themselves stochastic. The identity of the more risky country would change over time, and shocks
to bk, btfp would also create additional dynamics.
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Under complete markets the exchange rate must satisfy,
Qt+1
Qt
=
M?t+1
Mt+1
. (7)
Last, and following Abel (1999) among others, we define an “equity” asset that pays
out as dividend a levered claim on output (Dt = Y
λ
t ) in the home country, and similarly
in the foreign country. The parameter λ captures the financial and operating leverage of
corporations. The model-based definition of equity is the asset that pays out the model
dividends Yt − wtNt − It. As in most business cycle models, however, these dividends are
significantly less volatile and procyclical than the dividends in the data. The model can then
generate a significant equity premium, but not the high volatility of returns observed in the
data. This motivates our introduction of leverage, which is standard in the asset pricing
literature (e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004) and Wachter (2008)).
3.2 Calibration
Parameters are listed in Table 5. The period is one quarter. A first group of parameters
(α, δ, υ, µ, η) follow the real business cycle literature (Cooley and Prescott, 1995). The func-
tional form for the adjustment cost function follows Jermann (1998): φ(x) = a1
x1−η
1−η + a2,
where a1 and a2 are set such that the steady-state is independent of η and “marginal Q” is
one in the nonstochastic steady-state.
[Table 5 about here.]
A second group of calibration parameters pertains to the modeling of disasters and is
more difficult to calibrate. Barro (2006) and Barro and Ursua (2008) document, using panel
data on consumption and output for a sample that spans many countries and a century and
a half, that large declines in economic activity are fairly frequent. We follow their work and
assume that the probability of disaster is on average 1.7% per year, or 0.425% per quarter.
Their work also suggests that the average (risk-adjusted) size of output disaster is 43%, and
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similarly for consumption. Our model would require bk = btfp = 0.43 to generate a decline
of output or consumption equal to 43%. We set a significantly smaller size of disaster, equal
to bk = btfp = 0.3 in the low interest rate country (home country), to be conservative. We
thus assume that disasters are 30% smaller than estimated.7 We set risk aversion θ equal to
8.5 over consumption-leisure, so as to match approximately the equity premium in the low
interest rate group of countries in the data. This corresponds to a risk-aversion of about 2.5
over consumption alone. Next, we pick the disaster size for the high interest rate country
(foreign country) to match the equity premium in the group of high interest rate countries,
leading us to set b∗k = b
∗
tfp = 0.24. Finally, the persistence of the log probability of disaster is
0.92, and the unconditional standard deviation of the log probability is 2.05. These figures
are picked to replicate approximately the volatility of equity returns in the group of low
interest rate countries. It is noteworthy that our model requires that the probability of
disaster be fairly volatile. Importantly, we do not target the second moments of quantities,
the volatility of equity returns in the group of high interest rate countries, the level and
volatility of interest rates, or any exchange rate or carry trade moments. These moments
allow us to evaluate the fit of the model.
We consider an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption (IES) equal to
2. Our value for the IES is larger than the standard estimates of Hall (1988). However,
recent empirical evidence suggests that higher values are empirically plausible (see Bansal
and Yaron (2004), Guvenen (2006), Mulligan (2004), and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002)). A high
IES generates the sensible comparative statics that higher expected growth leads to higher
asset prices, and higher uncertainty leads to lower asset prices. Finally, note that in the
model, the correlation between consumption growth and the risk-free rate is low, and the
standard Hall (1988) regressions are significantly biased towards zero.
7The Solow residual is z1−α, so the downward shift in the production function during disasters is actually
20.9% in the home country and 16.6% in the foreign country. Reducing the disaster size further requires us
to have somewhat higher risk aversion, but has otherwise little effect on the results.
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Following Abel (1999) and Barro (2006), the leverage parameter λ is set to 2. For
simplicity, our calibration assumes that government bonds are risk-free, but this has little
effect on our results, other than to change the mean return on government bonds. Last,
we assume that the standard deviation of TFP shocks is σ = 0.9% (quarterly), and the
cross-country correlation of TFP shocks is 0.3, consistent with our data. In the data, we
find that the average volatility of productivity growth (where productivity is measured as
Y/N2/3) is 0.9% on average for the low interest rate countries and 1.3% on average for the
high interest rate countries. In the interest of clarity, we assume that the countries have the
same volatility of TFP.
In our benchmark model, the high interest rate country is the foreign country, which has
the lowest fundamental risk (e.g, the lowest disaster risk, b∗k = b
∗
tfp < bk = btfp). Precaution-
ary savings are small, hence the interest rate is high. The home country in contrast has a low
interest rate as the higher disaster risk implies high precautionary savings. On top of this
benchmark calibration, we also present results from the model with no disasters (i.e., the
basic RBC model), and the model where both countries are equally risky (i.e., bk = b
∗
k and
btfp = b
∗
tfp). These two additional calibrations help illustrate the effects of (1) adding disas-
ters with time-varying disaster probabilities to the standard RBC and (2) adding different
exposure of countries during disaster to the model in (1).
3.3 Impulse response functions
We start by depicting the response of quantities and prices to each of the three shocks of our
model to illustrate the mechanism. First, the standard (normally distributed, “small”) TFP
shock has the usual effects of increasing output, investment, consumption, and employment,
as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, equity prices and interest rates rise, while the exchange
rate of the country with the positive TFP shock depreciates. This response of the exchange
rate is consistent with the empirical literature (e.g., Acemoglu and Ventura (2002), Basu
et al. (2006), and Pavlova and Rigobon (2007)). Standard models such as Heathcote and
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Perri (2002) generate such a depreciation through a relative increase in the supply of the
home good. In our model, the depreciation follows from the first-order condition for risk
sharing: if consumption increases more in the home than in the foreign country, it must be
that consumption is cheaper there than in the foreign country.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Second, Figure 2 depicts a disaster realization. By definition, the disaster leads to a
permanent drop in productivity and an initial destruction of capital. Endogenously, con-
sumption, investment, and output fall by the same amount, while employment and interest
rates do not change. Equity prices fall significantly, which implies that stocks are risky since
their payoffs are low when marginal utility is high. This is the main source of the equity
premium in the model.
In the more risky country, all of the effects above are stronger. Because of the decreased
supply of goods in that country, the exchange rate appreciates. Hence, the country that
is most risky in terms of its stock market and quantities is the country whose currency is
safest, i.e., appreciates during disasters. While this result may appear counterintuitive, it
is actually consistent with experiences during several episodes, such as the recent nuclear
facility accident in Japan. Within the first five days of the earthquake on March 11, 2011,
the Japanese yen appreciated by about 6% against the U.S. dollar and roughly 4% against
the euro. This exchange rate appreciation is essentially a direct implication of complete
markets, since Equation (7) shows that the country with the largest increase in its marginal
utility must have the exchange rate that appreciates the most.8
[Figure 2 about here.]
Finally, Figure 3 presents the impulse response functions to an increase to the probability
of disaster. This is the most important shock in our model. (The effect of TFP shocks,
8In related research, we solve a small open economy model with incomplete markets and show that the
exchange rate of the more risky country may depreciate. This is because the wealth effect, which is shut
down by complete markets, can be quite important during disasters.
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which do not generate large risk premia, is well-known, while disaster themselves are rarely
observed.) Within each country, an increase in disaster risk leads to a decline of investment,
output, and employment, i.e., a recession. The shock to disaster probability affects investors’
expectations regarding future GDP; decreasing the mean and increasing risk. As shown
in Gourio (2009), a shock to disaster risk is analytically equivalent (for quantities) to a
preference shock: agents become more impatient and decide to invest less since the risk-
adjusted return on capital is lower.
This result relies on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) being greater than
unity, so that agents save less when the (risk-adjusted) return is lower. If the IES is smaller
than unity, the wealth effect prevails, and agents save more when the return is lower. In this
case, an increase in disaster risk leads to a boom. Finally, if the IES is exactly unity, there
is no effect of the increase in risk on macroeconomic quantities. On the other hand, the IES
has a small, limited effect on interest rates, stock prices, and exchange rates.
As a consequence, there is less incentive to produce and to work. Following an increase
in disaster probability, consumption increases, and then later falls. These consumption
dynamics break the perfect comovement that is predicted by the standard IRBC model and
de-link consumption and asset prices. The two countries are affected by the same increase
in disaster probability: the magnitude of the impact, however, is effectively larger in the
country where disaster risk is larger, leading to larger recessions. Equity prices drop because
of an increase in the discount rate, while the risk-free rate falls as demand for safe assets
increases. Last, the exchange rate of the more risky country appreciates, because marginal
utility increases more in this country.
[Figure 3 about here.]
3.4 Quantitative results
This section illustrates the effect of shocks to the world-wide disaster probability by com-
paring the implications for quantities, asset prices, and exchange rates of three models: (1)
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a standard real business cycle model with only TFP shocks; (2) a model with time-varying
risk of disaster, when both countries are equally risky (with a disaster size of 24%) and (3)
our benchmark model with time-varying risk of disaster, when the home country is more
risky (with a disaster size of 30%). The key result is that adding time-varying disaster risk
makes our model closer to the data, if (and only if) the two countries have heterogeneous
exposures to the disaster.
The separate online Appendix details our numerical solution algorithm. Given our in-
terest in time-varying risk premia, we cannot log-linearize the model, thus we resort to a
standard dynamic programming approach with discretization. All the moments are calcu-
lated by simulating the model in samples without disasters.9
3.4.1 Quantities
Panel I of Table 1 reports our data results, discussed in section 2. Panel II of Table 1 reports
the quantity implications of the different models. The first row reports the results for the
standard RBC model (i.e., no disaster risk). Since the two countries are perfectly symmetric,
and there is no net trade, the quantity dynamics are exactly the same in the two countries.
The quantity patterns within each country reflect the usual RBC results: consumption is
smoother than GDP, investment is more volatile than GDP, and employment is volatile, but
less than in the data. The cross-country correlation of consumption, employment, invest-
ment, and output are all equal to the assumed cross-correlation of TFP shocks, i.e., 0.3,
since there is no endogenous interaction between the two countries and TFP shocks are the
only source of fluctuations.
Turning to the model with both TFP shocks and disaster risk shocks (row 2), we see
that when the two countries are equally risky, the additional shock raises the volatility of
all series, but especially investment and employment. Investment and employment volatility
are now closer to the data than what the standard RBC model predicts. The risk shock
9See the online Appendix for statistics in samples with disasters. Our results are largely unaffected, and
the main effect is to increase the measured volatilities of all time series except employment and interest rates.
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is common across countries, hence it increases the cross-country correlation of quantities,
especially investment and employment. Our model, however, still implies that the cross-
country correlation of consumption should be greater than that of output, a puzzle noted at
least since Backus et al. (1992). Finally, when one country is more risky (row 3), the same
mechanism applies, to a larger extent for the more risky country. Our model replicates well
the volatilities of consumption, investment, employment, and output for low interest rate
countries.
However, the model underestimates substantially the volatilities of the high interest rate
group of countries. In the model, the countries in this group are somewhat less volatile
than in the low interest rate group, because they are less risky, whereas in the data they are
about twice more volatile than the low interest rate countries. These shortcomings could be
partly addressed by introducing more heterogeneity across countries, assuming for example
that the less risky countries in terms of disasters experience more volatile TFP shocks. We
discuss this extension below.
3.4.2 Asset prices
Panel I of Table 2 reports the mean, volatility, and cross-country correlation of the short-
term interest rate and equity excess returns. Panel II reveals first that, in the absence of
disaster risk, the model predicts tiny risk premia in the low and high interest rate country
(since our model has low risk aversion), and equity returns are very smooth. Furthermore,
the cross-country correlation of returns equals the correlation of TFP shocks. The model
generates substantial volatility of returns as well as a large equity premium, and a stable
risk-free rate, in our benchmark calibration with time-varying disaster risk. The annual
average excess return is 5.64% in the low interest rate country and 2.74% in the high interest
rate country.
In the data, high interest rate countries offer the lowest equity excess returns in local
currencies. Our calibration slightly underestimates the volatility of equity returns in the
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group of low interest rate countries, but we substantially under-predict (by a factor of about
three) the volatility in the group of high interest rate countries. Finally, our model generates
a range of interest rates that is too small: 1.85% to 2.4% in the model versus 0.8% to 5.2%
in the data. Note that incorporating default on short-term loans would reduce the spread
further in the model.
Returns are more correlated across countries in our model than in the standard RBC
model since they are all driven by the fear of a worldwide disaster. Because risk has a powerful
effect on returns, the correlation of returns is significantly higher than the correlation of
“fundamentals,” such as output or investment. In this sense, there is “excess comovement”
of stock markets. The benchmark model predicts a cross-correlation of returns that is even
higher than in the data (0.89 for equity excess returns and 0.98 for risk-free rates), but this
is not surprising since we abstract away from many idiosyncratic shocks or heterogeneities.
Finally, the model can also replicate the within-country correlation of quantities (such
as output or investment), as well as asset prices or expected returns. These results are
unreported since they are similar to Gourio (2009).
3.4.3 Exchange rates
Table 3 reports the corresponding moments for exchange rates. In our model with only TFP
shocks, the exchange rate has a non-negligible volatility, since consumption growth rates are
only weakly correlated. Adding disaster risk does not change this volatility if the home and
the foreign country have the same exposure to disaster risk. This is because shocks that move
countries’ marginal utilities by the same amount do not affect exchange rates. When the
risk exposures of the two countries are different, the exchange rate volatility rises, because
disaster risk now affects the countries’ marginal utilities differently, and the exchange rate
volatility becomes close to the one in the data. Simulated exchange rates are quite volatile,
with a standard deviation around 10.5% per year, versus about 8.6% in the data. Taking
into account the uncertainty around these two estimates, the exchange rate volatility in the
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model is not statistically different from that in the data.
In all models, the exchange rate is not far from a random walk, i.e., the autocorrelation
of the change of the exchange rate is very small. This is line both with the literature
(see notably Engel and West, 2005) and our data. Marginal utility is approximately a
random walk in the model, as TFP shocks and disaster shocks generate permanent changes
in consumption. In our benchmark model, there is some mean-reversion, because shocks to
disaster risk are transitory and hence lead to a transitory appreciation of the real exchange
rate of the more risky country. However, the persistence of the real exchange rate remains
high and our benchmark model yields a leptokurtic distribution of changes in exchange rates,
i.e., “fat tails,” even in samples without disasters. This is consistent with the data, and is
an improvement over the RBC model with its approximately Gaussian distributions. The
model does not, however, imply any significant skewness in the changes of the exchange rate,
whereas Panel I suggests that there is some skewness in the data.
3.4.4 Backus-Smith Puzzle
Turning to the correlation of exchange rates with macroeconomic aggregates or asset prices,
we see that in the basic RBC model the exchange rate of a country appreciates when its
output or consumption goes down, or when its equity return goes down. In particular,
as noted since Backus and Smith (1993) and Kollmann (1995), the correlation between
changes in exchange rates and relative consumption growth rate equals one.10 This result
holds exactly with power utility; while we have Epstein-Zin utility, the basic disaster risk
model still generates a very strong correlation, over 0.99, when there are only TFP shocks.
Our benchmark model, in contrast, leads to a weaker correlation of exchange rates with
relative output growth and especially consumption growth (0.66). This is because shocks to
10Backus and Smith (1993) note that in complete markets and with power utility, the change in the real
exchange rate is equal to the relative consumption growth in two countries times the risk-aversion coefficient,
thus implying a perfect correlation between the consumption growth and real exchange rate variations. Yet,
in the data, Backus and Smith (1993) find that the actual correlation between exchange rate changes and
consumption growth rates is low and often negative. Chari et al. (2002), Corsetti et al. (2008b), and Benigno
and Thoenissen (2008) confirm their findings.
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disaster probability generate a negative correlation between the country’s exchange rate and
its consumption growth. Because agents have recursive preferences (a preference for early
resolution of uncertainty), consumption and marginal utility are not proportional any more.
Shocks to uncertainty drive them in opposite directions in our framework, provided that the
IES is larger than unity. However, the benchmark model still implies a too strong correlation
of exchange rates with macroeconomic variables and equity returns.
3.4.5 Carry trade returns and UIP
Table 6 reports the results for the implications of the riskiness of the exchange rate on carry
trade returns and UIP. Consider a “carry trade” strategy: borrowing in a low interest rate
country, and lending in a high interest rate country, taking on the exchange rate risk. This
strategy generates a log excess return equal to:
rxt+1 = r
?
t − rt + ∆qt+1,
where r and r? denote the domestic and foreign risk-free rates and ∆q the change in the log
real exchange rate.
In the data, this strategy generates significant average excess returns, with a conditional
volatility equal to that of the exchange rate. Table 4 shows that the annual average return
on this strategy is 5.4%, with a volatility of 9.6%. Again, this average excess return does not
include transaction costs. Lustig et al. (forthcoming), using forward contracts whose bid-ask
spreads are easily available but for short samples, report an average net excess return of
3.1% (with a standard error of 0.5%) on samples of developed countries over the 1983–2009
period.
In our benchmark model, the high interest rate country is the foreign country, which has
the lowest fundamental risk (e.g, the lowest bk = btfp). Precautionary savings are small, hence
the interest rate is high.11 If a disaster occurs, this country’s currency depreciates, since its
11In the model, interest rates also vary because of changes in TFP, hence the low interest rate country
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marginal utility rises by a smaller amount. Hence, carry trades pay badly in bad times, and
investing in high interest rate countries is risky, so that investors require compensation in the
form of higher expected returns. Table 4 reports the mean and volatility of the carry trade
excess return and the correlation of the carry trade return with the average (across our two
groups of countries) of real consumption growth, real investment growth, real employment
growth, real GDP growth, and real stock market returns.
In the standard RBC model, the carry trade strategy does not generate any excess return
– the current interest rate is not correlated with the country’s riskiness. In our benchmark
model, with heterogeneous exposures to disaster risk, the carry trade generates a significant
excess return of 2.3%. The carry trade return is not fully captured by its correlation with
consumption growth. Carry trades pay off badly both when disasters hit and when disaster
risks rise; increases in disaster risk coincide with increases in consumption, thus the con-
sumption CAPM mismeasures the risk of the carry trade. Note, however, that the market
CAPM does not suffer from this measurement problem: the carry trade return is strongly
correlated with the market return. We obtain similar results with world output, investment,
and labor. In the data, as in the model, carry trade returns are positively correlated with
the average growth rates of output, investment, and labor.
Finally, we note that our model reproduces the failure of traditional uncovered interest
rate parity tests:
∆qt+1 = αUIP + βUIP (rt − r∗t ) + εt+1.
The RBC model, where risk-neutrality holds almost perfectly, generates a slope coefficient
very close to 1. Our benchmark model delivers a negative slope, lower than the one we
obtain on portfolios, but consistent with a vast empirical literature on bilateral exchange
rates. The failure of UIP is driven by variations in the probability of disaster. When p is
high, the exchange rate risk premium is large. At the same time, the risk-free rate of the
may not always be the more risky. However, for our parametrization, the variation in interest rates driven
by TFP is swamped by the differences in disaster risk.
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more risky country is lower due to heightened precautionary savings. These two observations
imply a negative UIP slope coefficient. Hence, our model reproduces the forward discount
puzzle in an economy without frictions.12
Finally, we report the correlation of carry trade excess returns with measures of aggregate
volatility. In the data, Lustig et al. (forthcoming) show that high interest rate currencies
tend to depreciate when aggregate equity volatility is high while low interest rate currencies
tend to appreciate. They measure monthly volatility using the standard deviation of daily
equity returns. Menkhoff et al. (forthcoming) obtain similar results with aggregate currency
volatility. In the model, aggregate volatility is high when the disaster probability is high,
given the time-series process for the disaster probability. The model also implies that carry
trade returns are highly correlated to U.S. equity returns when volatility is high (a finding
reported in Lustig and Verdelhan (2010)). Finally, Engel (2010) reports that while a positive
interest rate differential leads to a positive excess return at short horizons, the effect switches
signs at long horizons. Our benchmark model generates a positive excess return at short
horizons that slowly mean-reverts at longer horizon towards zero, and hence does not fully
capture this pattern (see the separate Appendix).
3.4.6 Fundamental risk and currency risk
A critical implication of our model is that countries that are more risky in terms of their
domestic fundamentals such as consumption, output, or stock prices, have low interest rates
and are less risky in terms of their exchange rates, because their currencies are counter-
cyclical. This is a direct implication of Equation (7), which is itself a direct implication of
complete markets. A key empirical question is whether this interpretation of low interest
rate countries as more risky fits the data. On one hand, it is consistent with the fact that
low interest rate countries deliver higher average equity excess returns. On the other hand,
12Additional frictions (like information heterogeneity or infrequent portfolio rebalancing) could strengthen
deviations from UIP and add interesting dynamics to exchange rates (see Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2006,
2010) for the impact of such frictions on exchange rates).
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it is inconsistent with the observed volatilities of macroeconomic quantities, equity returns
and interest rates: low interest rate countries should have higher volatilities, but in the data
they have lower volatilities. Empirically, this result appears fairly robust, and it is insensitive
to the number of portfolios and the aggregation method inside each portfolio: we consider
two, three, four, or five portfolios, using either simple means, GDP weights (measured at
purchasing power parity), or medians. In all these cases, we never obtain a high interest rate
portfolio that exhibits less volatile consumption growth than the low interest rate portfolio.
Solving this puzzle is obviously an important question for future research.13
Estimating fundamental risk is difficult. It is not obvious that low interest rate countries
such as Switzerland or Japan are more risky than high interest rate countries such as Aus-
tralia or New Zealand, and fundamental risk might be time-varying.14 Our paper uncovers
a potential tension between fundamental and currency risk.
3.4.7 Role of recursive utility
Most macroeconomic models use expected utility preferences, whereas we use recursive pref-
erences as introduced by Epstein and Zin (1989), which allow for a separation between risk
aversion and the inverse of the IES. Without recursive preferences, our model cannot gen-
erate the Backus-Smith anomaly. In the next paragraph we discuss how our results are
13If the IES equals unity, the model predicts no quantity response to a change in disaster probability, hence
both countries have the same quantity volatilities. The model also predicts a positive carry trade return and
volatile exchange rates. However, it is still the case that stock prices are more volatile in the low interest rate
country, which is contrary to the data. The habit model of Verdelhan (2010) is here an exception: even if
the consumption growth volatilities are the same in both countries, marginal utilities of wealth and interest
rates differ across countries because of the different (time-varying) market prices of risk.
14One way to illustrate the disconnect between fundamental risk and currency risk in our model is to use it
to interpret the recent international financial crisis. There is evidence that investors around the world feared
a Great Depression scenario in the Fall of 2008. Our model predicts that this increase in the probability
of disaster leads to a worlwide recession and sharp declines in stock markets. The more risky countries
endure larger recessions and see their currency appreciate. (In a fuller model with trade, capital flows out of
the more risky countries.) The U.S. was perhaps, during this crisis, the more risky country, since the U.S.
mortgage market was the source of the recession, and U.S. financial institutions were the ones most affected
by the crisis. Consistent with our model, the U.S. exchange rate appreciated sharply during the crisis, and
the U.S. current account increased. However, in contrast to our model, the recession was not larger in the
U.S. than in other countries. This failure is perhaps due to the aggressive policy response in the U.S., which
we do not model. If the U.S. is the less risky country, then the model cannot replicate the exchange rate
and current account patterns during the crisis.
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affected if we change either the risk aversion coefficient, or the IES coefficient to return to
the standard expected utility. This illustrates further the importance of recursive preferences
for our approach.
In our model, risk aversion determines both the magnitude of risk premia and the size
of the response of quantities to a disaster risk shock (since the importance of disaster risk
depends on risk aversion). Hence, solving the model with a lower risk aversion (θ = 2 so
that θ = 1/γ, and we are in the familiar case of expected utility) yields the same qualitative
effects, but they are much reduced in size. For instance, the equity premium is 1.5% per
year (5.6% in the benchmark). In contrast, changing the IES leads to a qualitative, rather
than quantitative change in behavior of the model. If the IES is less than unity, the model
implies that an increase in disaster risk leads to a boom of investment, employment, and
output. However, the model implies volatile exchange rates, along with a failure of the UIP
condition.
3.4.8 Robustness
The separate Appendix provides a detailed sensitivity analysis of the results. Introducing
default risk has little effect on our results. The volatility puzzle that we emphasize is partially
solved if one recognizes that high interest rate countries face higher TFP volatility; however,
this does not explain the high volatility of their equity returns or interest rates. Last, a
higher correlation of TFP across countries makes exchange rates less volatile.
4 Empirical Effect of Time-Varying Risk on Macro-
economic Quantities
We have shown how incorporating time-varying risk and the heterogeneous exposures to
it helps our model generate moments closer to the data. In this section, we provide an
empirical test of the main mechanism by studying the impact of time-varying risk on actual
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macroeconomic quantities. Measuring time-varying disaster probabilities is challenging. We
show that they can be approximated by measures of time-varying equity volatility: put
prices on U.S. stock market indices are highly correlated with U.S. (implied and realized)
equity volatility. The same is true in the model, where an increase in disaster probability
leads to an increase in stock market volatility. For data availability reasons, we thus use
shocks to equity return volatility as proxies for the shocks to the world disaster probability:
realized stock market volatilities are available for many countries over long samples, allowing
us to propose a measure of global volatility that starts in 1970. We then estimate impulse
responses of macroeconomic quantities to a shock to global equity volatility using standard
vector autoregressions (VAR).
4.1 Equity Volatility as Proxy for Disaster Probability
We find that high equity volatility is a reasonable proxy for disaster probability. We compare
the implied volatilities from put options, risk reversals, and the VIX Index. The VIX Index
uses a wide range of near-term and next-term in-the-money and out-of-the money S&P
500 call and put options, and then weights them to yield a constant, 30-day risk-neutral
measure of the expected volatility of the S&P 500 Index. Risk-reversals are measured as
the differences between the implied volatility of puts and calls with strike prices that are
symmetric around the money (i.e., the current value of the S&P 500 index). A positive
risk reversal means the implied volatility of puts is greater than the implied volatility of
symmetric calls, which implies that more market participants are expecting a drop in the
index than a rise, and vice versa if the risk reversal is negative.
Figure 4 presents the implied volatilities obtained from put options, risk reversals, and
the VIX index. We focus on implied volatilities measured out-of-the-money, i.e., for strikes
that differ from the value of the S&P 500 index. We measure the distance between the strike
and the spot index in terms of options deltas; the delta of an option represents the sensitivity
to changes in the underlying asset. The delta (δ) of a put varies between 0 for extremely
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out-of-the-money options to −1 for extremely in-the-money-options. A 10-δ (25-δ) put is an
option with a delta of 10% (25%). A 10-δ (25-δ) put option corresponds to a strike price that
is on average 8.2% (3.6%) below the value of the spot S&P 500 index. A 10-δ put option
with such a strike price thus offers a positive terminal payoff if the stock market decreases
by more than 8.2% over the next 30 days. We focus on this range because of the liquidity
of the option market.
The first panel of Figure 4 shows that the implied volatilities of out-of-the-money put
options move in sync with the VIX Index. The correlation with the VIX is 0.99 for both 10-δ
and 25-δ put options. This is not surprising since the VIX partially reflects these volatilities.
It shows that most of the large variations in the VIX do not come from above-the-money
calls (i.e., upside risk), but from downside risk.
The second panel of Figure 4 shows that risk reversals tend to be high when the VIX is
high. As a result, high implied volatilities of puts and calls as measured by the VIX partly
correspond to high expectations of large market decreases. The correlation between the VIX
and the risk reversals is 0.88 (with a standard error of 0.03) at 10-δ and 0.85 (with a standard
error of 0.04) at 25-δ. As a result, disentangling Gaussian risk from disaster risk is not an
easy task; see Farhi et al. (2009) for a methodology using currency options. In this paper,
we interpret shocks to equity volatility as shocks to disaster probabilities.
[Figure 4 about here.]
4.2 Comovement in realized and implied volatilities
We focus on a group of G7 countries for which monthly macroeconomic series are readily
available over long periods of time: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom,
and United States. The evidence presented above pertains to expected volatilities derived
from equity options. These series are not available for many countries or over long samples.
Fortunately though, implied volatilities and realized volatilities are highly correlated (despite
the presence of a volatility risk premium). We thus resort to realized volatilities.
29
We import daily MSCI equity returns for the sample. We build monthly series of stock
market volatility by recording standard deviations over calendar months. In the model,
disasters are global; they are assumed to affect countries differently, but happen at the same
time in all countries. How does this assumption compare to the data? Looking at realized
equity return volatilities or option-implied volatilities, our assumption does not seem far-
fetched. Option-implied or realized equity volatility series clearly contain a large common
component across countries. The first principal component, which is close to the mean of all
these series, accounts for more than 40% of total realized variance in a large set of 27 OECD
countries over 40 years, close to 50% for the G7 countries over 40 years, and more than 90%
of a set of nine option-implied volatilities over the last 15 years. As a result, we take, at
each point in time, the mean of our different realized volatility series over the countries in
sample: this mean volatility constitutes our measure of global disaster risk.
4.3 Impact of global volatility shocks on quantities
We also study the impact of global volatility shocks on monthly macroeconomic variables.
Our methodology follows Bloom (2009) and focuses on simple VARs. Details about our
VARs are in the separate online Appendix. Briefly, our VAR specification includes the
market return, global volatility, and macroeconomic time series. The latter are the 12
month log differences of industrial production or unemployment rates. We use 12 lags in the
VAR. The shock to volatility has no impact on the macroeconomic variable at time 0. This
orthogonalization assumption has little impact on our results.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figures 5 and 6 report the impulse response functions of industrial production and un-
employment rates to a shock on aggregate volatility. In our core sample, unemployment
rates increase and industrial production contracts when volatility increases. Bloom (2009)
reports similar results for U.S. employment and industrial production. Note, however, that
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we are using the average world volatility, and not the U.S. volatility as in Bloom (2009).
Our results are in line with the model’s predictions: when the probability of a global disaster
increases, a recession ensues with less production and employment. The magnitudes of the
responses are economically and statistically significant. A one-standard deviation shock on
aggregate volatility implies approximately a 0.8% decline in industrial production for the
U.S. The 2007–2009 subprime mortgage crisis corresponds to a 9 standard deviation shock
on aggregate equity volatility. In our VAR, such a shock would lead to a 7.2% decline in
industrial production. As a comparison point, in the data, the 12-month growth rate of
industrial production hit a bottom of −15% during the crisis. This strong result is not con-
fined to the U.S. economy. All countries present a similar negative effect, and interestingly,
even in this limited sample of OECD countries, there is some heterogeneity: for instance,
Japan is significantly more affected by a volatility shock than the other countries.
[Figure 6 about here.]
We report in the separate Appendix the same impulse response functions country by
country and with standard errors obtained by bootstrapping. All troughs are clearly negative
and significantly different from zero for industrial production. The same result holds for
unemployment, with clearly positive impulse response functions: peaks, however, are only
significant in Canada, Japan, and the U.S. Overall, we find a clear impact of aggregate
volatility shocks on macroeconomic aggregates.
5 Conclusion
This paper shows how the combination of time-varying risk and heterogeneous exposures to
that risk make international business cycle models closer to the data. An increase in disaster
risk leads to a worldwide recession, that is larger in the more risky countries, and to decline
in stock prices, interest rates, and a negative return on the carry trade. We provide direct
support for this mechanism by showing that aggregate volatility shocks have a significant
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effect on macroeconomic aggregates. The main tension in our complete market model is that
low interest rate countries are more risky in terms of fundamentals and hence more volatile,
while in the data they are less so. This tension is an invitation to consider more elaborate
models that incorporate default risk, monetary policy, and incomplete markets.
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Table 1: Business Cycle Statistics
Standard Deviations Cross-country Correlations
σ(∆c) σ(∆i) σ(∆n) σ(∆y) σ(∆c?) σ(∆i?) σ(∆n?) σ(∆y?) (∆c,∆c?) (∆i,∆i?) (∆n,∆n?) (∆y,∆y?)
Panel I: Data
1.45 4.40 1.13 1.81 2.62 7.74 1.77 1.99 0.40 0.61 0.42 0.55
[ 0.20] [0.56] [0.10] [ 0.27] [0.49] [1.30] [0.16] [0.24] [0.13] [0.12] [0.11] [0.14]
Panel II: Model
RBC 1.10 2.91 0.37 1.58 1.10 2.91 0.37 1.58 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30
Equal Risk 1.14 3.44 0.53 1.60 1.14 3.44 0.53 1.60 0.35 0.47 0.62 0.32
Benchmark 1.18 3.97 0.66 1.62 1.14 3.45 0.53 1.60 0.36 0.51 0.67 0.32
[0.11] [0.86] [0.19] [0.11] [0.09] [0.49] [0.12] [0.11] [0.10] [0.13] [0.14] [0.09]
Notes: This table reports the standard deviations of log differences in consumption, investment, labor and
output, along with the cross-country correlation of these variables. Panel I reports moments from the actual
data. We use series from the OECD database, available on Datastream. Data are quarterly. The maximum
sample period is 1970.I–2010.IV, but sample windows vary across countries. Additional information is
available in Appendix A. We focus on high versus low interest rate countries. We sort countries on their
interest rate levels and build four portfolios. We report statistics for countries in the first portfolio (low
interest rate countries) for the domestic economy. For the foreign economy, we report statistics for countries
in the last portfolio (high interest rate countries, denoted with a stat superscript ?). Panel II is constructed
by simulating the model, assuming no disasters are actually realized (see the Appendix D for simulations
that include disaster realizations). We solve three variants of the model: (1) a standard real business cycle
model with only TFP shocks; (2) a model with time-varying risk of disaster, when both countries are equally
risky; (3) our benchmark model with time-varying risk of disaster, where the domestic country is more risky.
We report moments obtained on one-year growth rates (measured at a quarterly frequency). Standard errors
are obtaining by block-bootstrapping (with blocks of four observations). For simulated data, we use a sample
of the same size as our actual data by averaging across 3,000 simulations.
39
Table 2: Financial Statistics
Averages Autocorr. Standard Deviations Cross-country Corr.
E(re) E(rf ) E(re?) E(rf?) Ac(rf ) Ac(rf∗) σ(re) σ(rf ) σ(re?) σ(rf?) (re, re?) (rf , rf?)
Panel I: Data
4.45 0.81 1.06 5.17 0.99 0.94 19.81 2.50 25.23 4.13 0.77 0.73
[ 2.56] [ 0.37] [3.28] [0.60] [0.00] [0.02] [1.31] [0.33] [1.68] [0.41] [0.05] [0.07]
Panel II: Model
RBC 0.17 3.26 0.17 3.26 0.99 0.99 3.32 0.18 3.32 0.18 0.30 0.28
Equal Risk 2.75 2.39 2.75 2.40 0.95 0.95 8.31 1.99 8.31 1.99 0.85 0.98
Benchmark 5.64 1.85 2.74 2.40 0.95 0.95 15.12 3.06 8.31 1.99 0.89 0.98
[1.57] [0.84] [0.85] [0.55] [0.02] [0.02] [5.67] [1.92] [2.87] [1.36] [0.07] [0.03]
Notes: This table reports the averages and standard deviations of log equity excess returns and log short-term
interest rates, along with the cross-country correlation of these variables and the first order autocorrelation
of risk-free rates. Data are from the IMF, MSCI, and Datastream databases. See Table 1 for more details.
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Table 3: Real Exchange Rates
Moments of ∆q Corr. ∆q and
σ(∆q) Ac(∆q) S(∆q) K(∆q) rm − rm,? rf − rf,? ∆c−∆c?
Panel I: Data
8.56 0.76 −0.59 3.19 0.09 0.05 −0.41
[0.83] [ 0.05] [0.23] [0.50] [0.11] [ 0.11] [0.13]
Panel II: Model
RBC 6.27 0.75 0.00 −0.06 1.00 0.19 1.00
Equal Risk 6.24 0.75 0.00 −0.05 1.00 0.19 1.00
Benchmark 10.71 0.71 0.07 2.73 0.98 −0.13 0.66
[2.17] [0.04] [0.46] [2.79] [0.01] [0.10] [0.10]
Notes: This table reports the averages, standard deviations, annual autocorrelation, skewness and kurtosis
of changes in log real exchange rates, along with the cross-country correlation of changes in log real exchange
rates with cross-country differences in real equity returns, real risk-free rates, and real consumption growth.
For actual data, we use series from the IMF, OECD, MSCI, Datastream databases. See Table 1 for more
details.
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Table 4: Carry Trade Excess Returns
Moments of rx Corr. rx and UIP
E(rxt+1) σ(rxt+1) ∆c ∆i ∆n ∆y rmt+1 σrmt+1 βUIP R
2
UIP
Panel I: Data
5.31 9.59 0.29 0.37 0.17 0.32 0.15 −0.06 −0.23 0.00
[1.33] [0.92] [0.17] [0.14] [0.13] [0.16] [0.15] [0.07] [0.33] [0.01]
Panel II: Model
RBC 0.00 6.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 1.00 0.00
Equal Risk 0.00 6.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
Benchmark 2.36 10.87 −0.24 0.42 0.52 0.15 0.62 −0.61 −2.90 0.04
[1.02] [2.18] [0.15] [0.19] [0.18] [0.12] [0.17] [0.13] [0.17] [0.00]
Notes: This table reports the averages and standard deviations of carry trade excess returns, along with the
cross-country correlation of these excess returns with the average (across portfolios) of macroeconomic and
financial variables: real consumption growth, real investment growth, real employment growth, real GDP
growth, real stock market returns, and the changes in stock market return volatilities. The last two columns
report the UIP slope coefficient (obtained on quarterly series) and the associated R2. See Table 1 for details.
For the UIP regression we use 200 simulations of 50,000 periods to avoid a short sample bias. All other
results do not depend on the length of the sample.
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Table 5: Calibration Parameters
Parameter Symbol Home / Foreign
Capital share α .34
Depreciation rate δ .02
Share of consumption in utility υ .30
Discount factor β .994
Adjustment cost curvature η .15
Trend growth of TFP µ .0025
Standard deviation of ordinary TFP shock σ .009
Correlation of TFP shocks (σ, σ∗) 0.3
IES 1/γ 2
Risk aversion over consumption-leisure bundle θ 8.5
Drop in TFP in case of disaster btfp/b
∗
tfp .3 / .24
Capital destruction in case of disaster bk/b
∗
k .3 / .24
Mean log disaster probability µp −.0565
Persistence of log(p) ρp .92
Unconditional std. dev. of log(p)
σp√
1−ρ2p
2.05
Leverage λ 2
Notes: This table reports the parameters used to solve and simulate our model. The time period is one
quarter. Home and foreign countries are identical unless otherwise indicated.
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions to a TFP shock: This figure presents the
impulse response functions of macroeconomic and financial variables to a standard TFP
shock. Quantities are in percentage deviation from the balanced growth path (BGP). Asset
returns are in percentage change per quarter. The disaster probability is in percentage, and
the disaster realization is an indicator function.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions to a Disaster Realization: This figure presents
the impulse response functions of macroeconomic and financial variables to a disaster real-
ization. Quantities are in percentage deviation from the balanced growth path (BGP). Asset
returns are in percentage change per quarter. The disaster probability is in percentage, and
the disaster realization is an indicator function.
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions to a Disaster Probability Shock: This figure
presents the impulse response functions of macroeconomic and financial variables to an
increase to the probability of disaster. Quantities are in percentage deviation from the
balanced growth path (BGP). Asset returns are in percentage change per quarter. The
disaster probability is in percentage, and the disaster realization is an indicator function.
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Figure 4: Implied Volatilities from Put Options, Risk Reversals, and VIX Index:
The first panel of this figure presents the implied volatilities of put options on the S&P
500 index, along with the VIX index. The VIX index measures the risk-neutral implied
volatilities of a set of in-the-money and out-of-the-money puts and calls on the S&P 500.
We use put options that are approximately 10-δ and 25-δ away from the money. The second
panel of this figure reports 10-δ and 25-δ risk-reversals. Risk-reversals are measured as the
differences between the implied volatility of puts and the implied volatility of calls with
strike prices that are symmetric around the money. Implied volatilities are annualized and
reported in percentages. For presentation purposes, risk-reversals are multiplied by 2. Data
are from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.
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Figure 5: Response of Industrial Production to a Shock on Average Realized
Volatility: This figure plots the impulse response functions of unemployment rates to a
one-standard deviation shock on average volatility in the G7 countries: Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. Data are monthly. The sample
is 1970.1 – 2009.12, except for the United Kingdom (1971.1 – 2009.12) and Canada (1995.1
– 2009.12). We do not have industrial production indices for Italy. Volatility measures
correspond to the standard deviations of equity returns over calendar months. The average
volatility is the mean of these different standard deviations over the same countries. VARs
contain the following variables: market returns, volatility, and industrial production.
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Figure 6: Response of Unemployment to a Shock on Average Realized Volatility:
This figure plots the impulse response functions of unemployment rates to a one-standard
deviation shock on average volatility in the following G7 countries: Canada, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States. Data are monthly. The sample
is 1970.1 – 2009.12, except for France (1978.1 – 2009.12), Germany (1992.1 – 2009.12) and
Italy (1980.1 – 2009.12). Volatility measures correspond to the standard deviations of equity
returns over calendar months. The average volatility is the mean of these different stan-
dard deviations over the same G7 countries. VARs contain the following variables: market
returns, volatility, and unemployment rates.
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